JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
which I had developed a subjective feel also. I knew that some Trukese kinship terms went together to form a system of terminology and that others were what I called "special" terms that did not fit into the system. By what criteria was I deciding that some terms were special and that others belonged together in a system of terms? It presumably involved the way in which the meanings (to me) of the terms were interrelated structurally. My effort to find a way of making these interrelationships explicit opened up for me the possibility of a rigorous descriptive semantics. My own experience leads me to conclude that asking questions of oneself as an informant is not necessarily an unsound procedure. On the contrary, it can be highly productive, especially if it allows us to convert subjective and intuitive processes within us into objectivized analytical operations.
IV
Ordinarily it is my objective as an English-speaking ethnographer to describe in English the culture of a non-English speaking people for the information of fellow speakers of English, who presumably know no more about the culture described than I did before I went out and tried to learn it. Such an account inevitably appears highly informative to those who read it. By contrast, an account of my own culture in my own language must appear highly uninformative to fellow speakers of English with much the same culture. It says what the audience already largely knows. Interest focuses on the variations of detail that reveal subcultural differences between ethnographer and audience. The ethnographer is inclined to omit consideration of the things that would be most informative to someone entirely unfamiliar with the culture he is describing. The language of description in this case, moreover, is at the same time a code for the cultural concepts described. Unless special care is taken, description can lapse into meaningless tautology.
To avoid these pitfalls and to make my account comparable with my accounts of alien cultures, I have taken as my audience a reader for whom English is a second language. Until now he has attributed to English kinship terminology, insofar as he has encountered it at all, significations corresponding to the meanings of kinship terms in his native language and culture. My object is to explain to him the meanings of my kinship terms.
The utility of this approach is obvious. One test of the adequacy of this account, I have said, is that it not do violence to my own feel, as informant, for the structure of what is described. This is the subjective test of adequacy. An equally important test is that it provide an alien with the knowledge he needs to use my kinship terminology in a way I will accept as corresponding with the way I use it. This is the objective test of adequacy. An account is deficient to the extent that it fails the test.
V
The description and analysis presented here are concerned only with kinship expressions used in reference. The data analyzed, furthermore, have only to do with the situation in which someone inquires of another, not in the presence of the person being inquired about, "What kin relationship, if any, is he (she) to you?" This invites the answer, "He (she) is my ," or "He (she) is not a relative." The importance of controlling the context in which data are elicited is obvious when one considers how personal considerations affect the use of kinship terms in address' or in the presence of the person being inquired about, as illustrated by Schneider and Homans (1955) . As this controlling question suggests, I am concerned in this paper with the context in which information is asked and truthfully given about the nature of the kin connection between two persons.
The number of possible answers is finite. To establish levels of contrast, we can then ask for any relative, "Is she (he) your ?" in connection with every expression. The answer can be "Yes" or "No" (with a qualification to be noted below). When the same person can be referred to by more than one kinship expression, the several expressions are synonyms, belong to different terminological systems relating to the same domain (not a problem in the present case), or are at different levels of contrast in the taxonomy of kin relationships (as with uncle and mother's brother). Otherwise, the informant can trace his relationship to the person in question in different ways; a different kin type is in fact being denoted by each kinship expression (as when one of the informant's kinsmen has married another).
Some of the expressions we obtain are lexemes in that they signify what cannot be predicted from the significata and arrangement of their constituent parts (Goodenough 1956:199, 206-208) . Others are not lexemes, having significata that may be understood as relative products of lexemes. Thus uncle and halfbrother are lexemes, but mother's brother is not. Analysis need be concerned only with the lexemes of a terminological system, since their relative products need no further definition.
VI
A system of kin relationships rests on the established institutions and customs relating to membership in households, sexual rights, the definition of procreation, the legitimization of progeny as members of a jural community, and the like. My own kinship system is no exception. The very definition of kin-types requires that we take account of certain principles of family organization in my particular subculture.
Kinship is regarded as following from biological procreation. Conception is seen as resulting from a single sexual union of a man as genitor and woman as genetrix; and prenatal growth is independent of subsequent sexual unions. My culture allows for an individual to have only one genitor as well as only one genetrix, unlike Lakalai culture in New Britain, which allows for the possibility that several men may be cogenitors of the same individual. My culture also disallows the possibility of conception without a genitor, unlike Trobi and Island culture, which has the dogma that men play no essential part in procreation (Malinowski 1932). Each individual must have a genitor as well as a genetrix.
As genitor and genetrix of joint progeny, a man and woman are supposed to have established a common household independent of the household of any other adults. Following traditional procedures known as marriage they are supposed to have entered into lifelong agreement to maintain such a household, to confine their sexual relations to one another, and to be jointly responsible for the care, socialization, education, and sponsorship of their joint progeny. No man may be married to more than one woman, or woman to more than one man, at a time. Remarriage by the survivor following the death of his (her) marriage partner is permitted. Although marriage is ideally for life, there are formal procedures for terminating a marriage, divorce and annulment, after which a man and woman are free to marry again. The common household established by a marriage is dissolved following a divorce or annulment.
The male partner to a marriage is the female partner's husband and the female partner is the male partner's wife. A husband and wife refer to their joint male progeny as their son, to their female progeny as their daughter, and to their collective progeny as their children. They are their progeny's father (genitor)7 and mother (genetrix) respectively and their progeny's parents collectively. The joint progeny refer to one another as their brother (if the person referred to is male) and their sister (if the person referred to is female).
A married man and woman are a single social unit whose solidarity, joint interests, and responsibilities take precedence over obligations and interests either may have in any other relationship. Their relations to their dependent progeny might appear to be an exception to this principle, but ideally their obligations to their progeny are joint and cannot be in conflict with their mutual interests. The unity of married pairs extends to almost all aspects of kin relationships and to many aspects of social relationships generally. Whatever obligation a person may have to kinsmen, for example, his marriage partner must share that obligation as well. A man should be as prepared to give financial aid to a dependent kinsman of his partner as to one of his own.
The foregoing ideal of what is supposed to be does not always obtain in fact. A man and woman may establish a common household without having gone through a formal marriage. Their marriage may be dissolved, formally or informally. Men and women may have sexual relations and procreate with other than their marriage partners. Responsibility for the care, socialization, education, and sponsorship of progeny may be assumed by other than the genitor and genetrix. The cultural principles for classifying kin relationships necessarily take account of such departures from the ideal.
As it turns out, the biological connections of genitor and progeny and of genetrix and progeny take priority, when publicly acknowledged, except under special and very limited conditions. They provide a principle that no ego may acknowledge a relationship with more than one person at a time as his father or his mother. Furthermore, no ego may ever establish more than one such relationship, except by legal adoption, in which the previous relationship is in effect formally dissolved. The original relationship thus established need not be with the genitor or genetrix, but once established so that a person says "She is my mother" in answer to the question "What relationship is she to you?," the same answer cannot ever be given with reference to another person (provided, of course, that the person referred to is not within hearing).8 Only of the genitor and genetrix, finally, can it be said "He (she) is my true (real) father (mother)."
Beyond the relationships between members of the same immediate family is a wider set in which there are ascribed dependency obligations and rights for as long as either party to the relationship lives. And beyond this is another set of relationships in which their are no such lifetime obligations. These categories of relationship can best be described after we have analyzed the kinship terminology. VII The lexemes that can be obtained in answer to the question that provides the context for this analysis are presented herewith. After each are listed the denotata that follow from the assumption that biological procreation, marriage, and social responsibility for progeny all go together according to the ideal pattern and usual expectation. The kin-type notation used for this is: All other denotata are represented as relative products of these, e.g. FaBrSo, SpSbCh. Following the denotata noted in this fashion are descriptions of how the kinship terms are used when usual expectations about biological procreation, marriage, etc., are not met. 19. My foster father. Male head of a household in which ego has been incorporated as a dependent juvenile member, but not legally adopted, and when ego has or has had a relationship to someone else as my father.
20. My foster mother. Female head of a household in which ego has been incorporated as dependent member, but not legally adopted, and when ego has or has had a relationship to someone else as my mother.
21. My foster son. Any male juvenile incorporated as a dependent member of the household of which ego is male or female head, and for whom ego is neither 1, 2, 7, or 8.
22. My foster daughter. Any female juvenile incorporated as a dependent member of the household of which ego is male or female head, and for whom ego is neither 1, 2, 7, or 8.
23. My foster brother. Any male who has been incorporated as a juvenile dependent into the household in which ego is also a juvenile dependent or who is a juvenile dependent in the household into which ego has been incorporated as such.
24. My foster sister. Any female who has been incorporated as a juvenile dependent into the household in which ego is also a juvenile dependent or who is a juvenile dependent in the household into which ego has been incorporated as such. derivative groups la and lb refer exclusively to affinal kin types in contrast with group 1, which refers exclusively to consanguineal kin types. Looking at group 1 and its derivatives, we find it convenient to analyze the terminology for consanguineal kin types first and then to treat the terminology for affinal kin types as derivatives or extensions of it. The trouble with this is that group 4 then stands out as a derivative set of terms apparently without a consanguineal base from which to be derived. As it turns out, however, this is not a problem, because group 4 stands in the same relation to "ego" as groups lb and ic stand in relation to group 1. According to the strategy adopted for analysis, then, the groups of terms distribute with respect to consanguineal-affinal distinctions as shown in Table I . Table II shows how groups 1, 2a, and 3 (the ones denoting consanguineal kin-types) distribute on a genealogical chart. It is immediately evident from the distribution that group 3 stands in complementary opposition to a supergroup consisting of groups 1, 2, and 2a. The difference between them is of the same kind as discussed above in connection with the difference between first, second, third, etc., as modifiers of my cousin-the lesser number of generations separating ego and alter from the nearest genitor (genetrix) or progenitor they have in common. If the lesser number of generations is zero, ego and alter are in a lineal relationship; if the lesser number of generations is one, they are first-degree collaterals; if the lesser number is two, they are seconddegree collaterals, etc. The dividing line between the denotata of group 3 and those of the other groups is not between collateral and lineal relationships, however, but between relationships that are two or more degrees of collateral distance as against those that are less than two degrees distant. All of the former relationships, and only these, are referred to by the group 3 term, my cousin.
It appears then that one of the discriminant variables in the Yankee kinship terminology is: It remains to find a discriminant variable or variables that will differentiate groups 1, 2, 2a, and 5. It is evident that the denotata of group 5 constitute a subclass of the denotata of group 2a. Therefore we may set group 5 aside and concentrate on the difference(s) between groups 1, 2, and 2a. Inspection of Table II Table II ) vertically as the space between a genitor or genetrix and his or her progeny and horizontally as the distance between two individuals with a genitor in common, then all kin types denoted by terms in group 1 are one unit of distance from ego; all kin types denoted by terms in group 2 are two units of distance from ego; and all kin types denoted by terms in group 2a are three or more units of distance from ego. Moreover, within group 2a the denotata of expressions with only one great/grand are three units of distance from ego; expressions with a great great/great grand denote kintypes that are four units of distance from ego; and so on with an additional unit of distance being added for each additional great. We assume, furthermore, that the marriage tie does not count as a unit of geneaological distance, but only a vertical or horizontal consanguineal link as just defined. Thus FaBr and FaBrWi are both two units of distance away from ego, and Br, BrWi, and WiBr are one unit of distance away.
Genealogical distance provides a conceptual variable that includes ego as one of its complementary values, for ego is necessarily at zero distance from himself on a genealogical tree. Hu and Wi are also at zero distance from ego. Thus ego is one of the consanguineal categories from which affinal terminology can be derived, as was suggested in Table I This approach will give us the paradigm for groups 1, 2, and 3 as shown in Table IV . This approach gives the paradigm for groups 1 and 2 shown in Table V . The use of variable 4 in Table IV has the effect of distributing the terms in rows within each group so that those designating collaterally more-distant kin types come after those designating collaterally nearer kin types. The effect of variable 7 in Table V is to rearrange the rows so that within each group the terms designating generationally more-distant kin types come after those designating generationally closer ones. So far there is no basis for choosing one of these models over the other. Each preserves the integrity of groups 1 and 2 and is acceptable from this point of view. The difference is that one emphasizes collateral and the other generational distance. If analysis of the rest of the terminology indicates that one of these emphases fits the data better than the other, the choice between them is clear. Otherwise these emphases remain Tables IV and V we may use an alternative derivational rule in which we substitute generations removed for the words units of genealogical distance removed. The former phrasing is in keeping with variable 2 and has the esthetic advantage that the number of repetitions of great is the same for both lineal and nonlineal alters (regardless of their generational distance), which makes the phrasing especially attractive for the construction given in Table IV , where linearity is used as a variable. On the other hand, the second phrasing of the derivational rule is in keeping with the recognition of generation as a factor in the alternative construction shown in Table V . In this phrasing the number of repetitions of great does not indicate the same number of generations that alter is distant from ego in both lineal and nonlineal relationships, but this is no problem in the construction in Table V , because lineality is not a relevant factor there.
For either of the two constructions shown in
It seems, then, that either phrasing of the derivational rule is adequate, but the first phrasing is more consistent with the use of variable 4 (lineality) in Table IV and the second is more consistent with the use of variable 7 (relative nearness of generation) in Table V .
IX
The affinal relationships covered by single kinship lexemes are severely limited in extent. They do not include any relationships in which there is more than one marital tie between ego and alter, nor do they include any relationships in which ego and alter are two or more degrees distant collaterally or separated by more than two units of genealogical distance.
Affinal relationships can be readily described by means of derivational rules. We consider first the expressions with step-in group la.
The cultural ideal for family organization produces an expectation that ordinarily certain affinal kin types will be filled by the same persons as fill certain consanguineal kin types. Such convergent kin types, though conceptually different, may be called "structurally equivalent" (Goodenough 1964:231-232). In Yankee kinship terminology we are interested in the affinal kin types that are structurally equivalent to consanguineal kin types one unit of geneaological distance from ego, where in normal expectation FaWi =Mo, MoHu=Fa, SpSo=So, SpDa=Da, PaSpSo=Br, and PaSpDa=Si. With this in mind we may state the derivational rule for group la as: Rule 2. Any affinal kin type that is structurally equivalent to a consanguineal kin type denoted by a term in group 1 is denoted by an expression consisting of the corresponding term in group 1 with the prefix step-.
Similar considerations enable us to state the derivational rule for the set of expressions in group ic:
Rule 3. Any relationship that is by virtue of common residence in the same household behaviorally equivalent to a relationship denoted by a term in group 1, but not also structurally equivalent to it, is denoted by the corresponding term in group 1 with the adjective foster.
The derivational rules for the remaining affinal relationships follow. With these additional variables we can put all the affinal terminology into the same componential paradigm with the consanguineal terminology provided we rephrase discriminant variable 2 as "degree of genealogical distance between ego and alter or alter's structural equivalent." This is necessary in order to keep my stepbrother and my stepsister within the group of kin types that are one unit of genealogical distance away from ego. The resulting paradigm appears in Table VI .
XI
Other terms not covered in Table VI Table VI Table VI would remain unchanged. The effect would be to rearrange the terms within each block so that 4.2 (7.1) terms would now come ahead of the 4.1 (7.2) terms as closer to ego. The collaterally more distant to ego would now be seen as the generationally closer. Thus the possibilities for alternative componential models of my own version of Yankee kinship terminology are limited to a minor sector of the semantic structure of the system as a whole. Alternative models that would have a more radical effect on the semantic structure can be constructed only by violating the canons of analysis-in this case at the expense of the integrity of the sets of terms comprising the blocks in Table VI , an integrity we felt it necessary to preserve in order to reveal the structural relationships that the step-, -in-law, and great sets of expressions have with the basic sets of which they are derivatives.
XIII
The semantic structure of Yankee kinship revealed in Table VI fits perfectly the distinction to which I referred earlier between relationships outside the immediate (nuclear) family in which lifelong obligations obtain and those in which they do not. All relationships within two degrees of collaterality (1.1 relationships) have ascribed lifelong obligations, whereas all relationships two or more degrees distant collaterally (1.2 relationships), the ones covered by the term my cousin, have no ascribed lifelong obligations other than a show of cordiality. Even among first cousins within the same generation there are no demands beyond this that they can make upon one another by virtue of cousinship alone. The extent to which they chose to cultivate their relationship beyond this is entirely optional. Cousins tend to have dealings with one another, therefore, by virtue of the 1.1 relatives they have in common. Given the facts of human longevity and reproduction, common 1.1 relatives bring first cousins in the same generation together much more frequently than they do any other cousins. In practice, therefore, people tend to have dealings mainly with their contemporary first cousins. When the common 1.1 relatives who bring them together have all died, there cease to be occasions for their having dealings with one another except as residential proximity, mutual friendship, or sentiment about the importance of kinship may promote them. They are no longer comembers of anyone's more immediate personal kindred based on 1.1 relationships.
That there are basic lexemes only for consanguineal kinsmen in the 1.1 set who are less than three units of genealogical removal from ego also accords with the pattern of kinship obligation. Responsibility for pre-adult childrenfor their survival needs, emotional development, socialization, enculturation, and education-rests first upon their fathers and mothers, their primary senior relatives. Those on whom these responsibilities next fall are the secondary senior relatives. It rarely happens that a tertiary senior relative has any occasion to assume such responsibility, though a great uncle and great aunt are sometimes called upon to do so. Thus the basic lexemes cover those relationships in which dependency rights and duties are primarily and secondarily active. Similarly, responsibility for care of the aged falls primarily on their own sons and daughters and secondarily on their grandsons, granddaughters, nephews, and nieces. An old person is rarely without junior relatives nearer than grand nephews or grand nieces on whom he can depend, and the latter are not likely to be old enough and well enough established to be able to help care for them. Thus the basic lexemes cover those relationships in which dependency rights and duties have first and second priority and are active in practice, and the relationships in group 2a (those involving great) are the ones in which dependency rights and duties have tertiary or remoter priority and have little chance of activation. Omitting consideration of affinal terminology, our analysis of this variant gives the paradigm for consanguineal kin shown in Table IX. It would be tempting here to put all the lineals (4.1) in one group and the nonlineals (4.2) together in another, as in the analysis published by Wallace (1962); but this is avoided to preserve the integrity of the set of terms for primary consanguines still needed as a base for handling the affinal terminology. Such a procedure would also obscure the way the discriminant The results appear in Table X . In effect they incorporate the meaning of great (derivational rule 1) into the paradigm through the addition of variable 13. Its placement in the extreme right-hand column of the table consolidates groups 2 and 2a rather than keeping them as separate blocks, one a derivative of the other. The variables in the first two left-hand columns segregate the terms, as marked by the horizontal lines, into four major groups, exactly like those in Table IX , corresponding to the major concentric circles of kinsmen in ego's personal kindred. That the terms for affinal kin-types fit so perfectly within the same fourfold division underscores the primacy in Yankee kinship of the relationship between husband and wife together as alter egos at the center of their respective and overlapping personal kindreds.
XIV
Because Table X has the same structural organization as Table IX , comparison of the two shows exactly wherein the subcultural variants of Yankee kinship usage differ from one another: on the extent to which the application of variable 13 is obligatory. By considering variant systems and attempting to find ways of structuring them so that their differences and similarities are expressed most clearly and precisely in the resulting paradigms, we have found yet another aid to arriving at componential models that do optimal justice to the phenomena of study.
It is also evident from a comparison of Tables IX and X that the basic structure of Yankee kinship is the same in each. When sufficient data on the various subcultural variants are available, comparison of their componential structures will show us to what extent they all have the same basic organization. We can then see with much greater precision than has been possible heretofore the relationship between variations in basic semantic structure of the terminological systems and variations in the social and behavioral organization of kin relationships-in the ways, that is, in which duties and group memberships distribute over the field of kin types.
There is a problem arising in the model presented in Table X that does not arise as clearly in Table VI . The terms in group 5 refer only to lineal kin types that are more than two units of genealogical distance away from ego, that is to the lineal kin types in group 2a. In Table VI we can see group 5 as a substitute for the lineals in 2a, which is clearly segregated in the paradigm from group 2. But in Table X groups 2 and 2a are merged into a single block of terms whose boundaries do not correspond with those of group 5. We cannot tit group 5 as a substitute for any contiguous set of terms in Table X . This implies that there are some aspects of the kinship terminology for Table VI appears to be a "truer" model, and there are others for which the paradigm in Table X appears to be "truer." One model brings out one aspect of the semantic structure and another brings out another, but both aspects cannot be readily brought out in the same model.
XV
The exercise presented here illustrates my concept of the contribution of componential analysis to anthropological and behavioral science.
It enables us to summarize in a succinct way what we think we know about the categorical organization of phenomenal domains as revealed by the use of linguistic labels for the categories within them. It forces us to be precise and rigorous in stating what we think we know, thereby helping us to clarify to ourselves our knowledge and its limitations. The results of analysis, as illustrated in Table X , portray in an objective manner complicated relationships for which otherwise we have only a subjective feel. These relationships and the structures they form thus are made much more amenable to systematic comparison for scientific purposes. Componential analysis provides a means for evaluating the adequacy of ethnographic statements regarding the cultural organizations of phenomena we presume other people to have. It imposes a set of standards or quality controls on the collection and processing of ethnographic data, thereby making it easier for independent investigators to replicate one another's data and analytical conclusions. It should be easy for any reader to test the extent to which the model of Yankee kinship here presented fits his own subculture, for example. If he analyzes his own kinship terminology using the same control question and following the same procedures and canons of analysis, we shall be in a position to undertake comparisons that are far more controlled than any made by anthropologists to date. 3 The denotatum of any given utterance of a word is what the word points to (denotes). As I see it, this is never a "thing" but a perception or conception of something, i.e. something that is discriminated ideationally or sensually as such from what it is not. Denotata are minimal classes or categories of real or imagined objects, events, and relationships. Following Morris' (1946) usage, the set of possible denotata for a word is its designatum, a more general class of which any particular denotatum is a member. The criteria for being in the class are what the word signifies, its significatum. The semantic components are the various criteria that in combination comprise a word's significatum. These criteria are the contrasting values of perceptual or conceptual variables. Any discrimination necessarily sorts phenomena into at least two complementary classes, e.g. male and female. The criss-crossing of several such discriminations partitions a larger perceptual or conceptual universe into subuniverses. If each subuniverse is labeled with a word, then the set of labels for all the subuniverses is a terminological system, in which the significatum of any one label is made up of the particular values of the particular variables that discriminate the subuniverse it designates from all the other subuniverses in the universe. Componential analysis systematically contrasts the sets of denotata of the labels in a terminological system in order to arrive at hypotheses regarding the variables and their values that will most elegantly predict all of their respective denotata. The result is an inductively developed and validated "model" of the conceptual organization of an ideational domain, regardless of how accurately it represents the actual conceptual organization in other than the analyst's "head."
4 For extensive discussions of this question see Wallace (1961:29-41) and Goodenough (1963:257-264).
